SCAM WARNING digitrete.it bluegreensport.it serrenticalcio.it odadiaccetoragazzi.it integral-coaching-essen.de

digitrete.it

bluegreensport.it

serrenticalcio.it

odadiaccetoragazzi.it

integral-coaching-essen.de

These are scam websites. They will send you some $10 Chinese shoes/boots, from China. Not the $200 – $500 shoes that you order.

All of these websites were created in the past couple of months and registered through a German registrar.

Cisco SPA BLF Call Pickup not working with Asterisk 13

(update: I think I realised that this only applies to PJSIP. With chan_sip it works the same as the rest of the Internet would tell you).

6 hrs later, I discovered that Cisco SPA5xx with firmware 7.6.1, and Asterisk 13, require the ‘system type’ in the attendant console settings, setting to Broadsoft. It doesn’t work when set to Asterisk (Directed Call Pickup doesn’t work). This has been a long night.

I also had to set the function as below:

fnc=sd+cp+blf;sub=715@$PROXY;ext=715@$PROXY;nme=Name

without the ext= it still doesn’t work.

It needs both, sub= and ext=, and system type = broadsoft

So, broadsoft as system type, directed pickup code **# or whatever, disable lines 2 – 7 or whatever, set type to private, and use above extended function.

This applies whether you have an attendant console are just using the spare line keys.

My SIP attack IP blocklist

Thanks to fail2ban (with correct new “security” log and regex enabled on asterisk 1.8+ (they don’t try to register any more!)), I collect IP addresses of people attempting to hack/fraud SIP systems. I then block the closest, widest IP subnet. I don’t care if I’m blocking a continent at a time. As and when my handful of external users report problems (overlap of bad/good IP addresses), I will correct, but for now my block list at the router looks like this. Fail2ban blocks using iptables on the Asterisk box itself, but I then kill connections and add to my Mikrotik address-list on the router, after whois’ing the IP and looking if the provider has a wider netblock – then I go for that, otherwise I go for what looks like a good fit the for culprit. Thankfully we also pay for fraud insurance. Ideally, the external handsets would have VPN clients inbuilt, but alas this is not the case. I have configured small mikrotiks to travel with the handset but this seems like a cumbersome offering.

To begin with, this list was called “PlusServer”, because the majority of attacks were coming from PlusServer AG. Next in line was RedStation.com. This killed off the most severe attacks, but since then I’ve had everything from Denmark to Palastine (twice) and Russia. Anyway here’s the list, from my Mikrotik address-list.

0 SipAttack 5.1.120.0/21
1 SipAttack 46.19.152.0/21
2 SipAttack 46.22.32.0/20
3 SipAttack 46.231.88.0/21
4 SipAttack 62.75.128.0/17
5 SipAttack 62.138.0.0/19
6 SipAttack 77.236.96.0/21
7 SipAttack 80.86.80.0/20
8 SipAttack 80.242.128.0/19
9 SipAttack 83.142.128.0/21
10 SipAttack 85.25.0.0/16
11 SipAttack 85.93.80.0/24
12 SipAttack 85.93.88.0/21
13 SipAttack 89.19.224.0/19
14 SipAttack 89.207.248.0/21
15 SipAttack 109.234.248.0/21
16 SipAttack 188.138.0.0/17
17 SipAttack 194.150.228.0/23
18 SipAttack 195.66.102.0/24
19 SipAttack 195.137.212.0/23
20 SipAttack 195.149.74.0/24
21 SipAttack 212.40.160.0/24
22 SipAttack 212.40.163.0/24
23 SipAttack 212.40.164.0/24
24 SipAttack 212.40.166.0/23
25 SipAttack 212.40.168.0/24
26 SipAttack 212.40.171.0/24
27 SipAttack 212.40.172.0/23
28 SipAttack 212.40.174.0/24
29 SipAttack 212.40.176.0/21
30 SipAttack 212.40.185.0/24
31 SipAttack 212.40.189.0/24
32 SipAttack 212.48.74.0/24
33 SipAttack 212.48.90.0/24
34 SipAttack 212.48.93.0/24
35 SipAttack 213.174.32.0/19
36 SipAttack 217.118.16.0/20
37 SipAttack 217.119.49.0/24
38 SipAttack 217.119.50.0/23
39 SipAttack 217.119.52.0/24
40 SipAttack 217.119.54.0/23
41 SipAttack 217.119.56.0/22
42 SipAttack 217.172.160.0/19
43 SipAttack 195.154.0.0/16
44 SipAttack 188.227.170.0/24
45 SipAttack 199.168.136.0/21
46 SipAttack 88.150.240.0/23
47 SipAttack 199.48.160.0/21
48 SipAttack 194.63.143.0/24
49 SipAttack 150.174.0.0/16
50 SipAttack 74.91.0.0/20
51 SipAttack 23.239.64.0/19
52 SipAttack 188.214.128.0/21
53 SipAttack 88.150.252.0/23
54 SipAttack 23.239.0.0/16
55 SipAttack 5.135.0.0/16
56 SipAttack 69.64.32.0/19
57 SipAttack 37.220.0.0/19
58 SipAttack 209.133.192.0/19
59 SipAttack 209.239.112.0/20
60 SipAttack 199.217.112.0/21
61 SipAttack 5.196.0.0/16
62 SipAttack 203.67.0.0/16
63 SipAttack 62.210.246.67
64 SipAttack 62.210.0.0/16
65 SipAttack 207.244.64.0/18
66 SipAttack 192.187.96.0/19
67 SipAttack 107.150.0.0/16
68 SipAttack 85.114.121.0/24
69 SipAttack 46.166.160.0/21
70 SipAttack 89.163.128.0/19
71 SipAttack 50.30.0.0/16
72 SipAttack 85.114.123.0/24
73 SipAttack 198.7.56.0/21
74 SipAttack 158.255.0.0/16
75 SipAttack 85.114.124.0/24
76 SipAttack 82.205.0.0/16
77 SipAttack 77.66.0.0/16

Remove windows 10 appx packages, but retain store

$Packages = “Microsoft.SkypeApp_3.2.1.0_x86__kzf8qxf38zg5c” , `
“Microsoft.People_1.10241.0.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.BingFinance_4.4.200.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.WindowsCalculator_10.1507.15010.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.BingNews_4.4.200.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.BingSports_4.4.200.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.Getstarted_2.2.7.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.WindowsMaps_4.1506.50715.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.BingWeather_4.4.200.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.WindowsSoundRecorder_10.1507.7010.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.WindowsAlarms_10.1507.17010.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.XboxApp_7.7.29027.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.Windows.Photos_15.803.16240.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.ZuneVideo_3.6.12101.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.ZuneMusic_3.6.12101.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.MicrosoftSolitaireCollection_3.3.8040.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.WindowsCamera_5.42.3008.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.MicrosoftOfficeHub_17.6106.23501.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_17.6106.42001.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe” , `
“Microsoft.Office.OneNote_17.6027.10021.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe”

ForEach ($package in $Packages)
{
remove-AppxProvisionedPackage -online -packagename $package
remove-AppxPackage -package $package
}

owncloud restrict download of entire root as zip

in /var/www/owncloud/lib/private/files.php

In this case, the workspace/store is called Savills. We also want to cover when the other download button is chosen from the root itself (download.zip).

 

Look for the code starting with “try”, and modify like below. Dirty but does the job for now.

try {
if ($name ===’download.zip’) {
header(“HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden”);
die(“Please choose a smaller selection to download. Use your back button to return.”);
}
else
if (($name ===’Storage.zip’) && (count($files) == “1”)) {
header(“HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden”);
die(“Tried to download whole of root, as Storage.zip. Not allowed.”);
}
else

Apple Mail (Mavericks) autocomplete / previous recipients will not remove

This is actually down to Exchange’s Suggested Contacts, I think.

 

If you open up Contacts, choose the Exchange account, you can search and remove the offending contact there. the actual list of “Suggested Contacts” appeared empty to me, but searching overall did return the contact in question, and removing it has finally removed it from the autocomplete list in Apple Mail.

Sage ACT! Connect stops syncing to local ACT! Pro 2012

The mobile device syncs to the ACT! Connect Portal, but entries from ACT! Pro 2012 do not make it into the portal, and nothing from the portal makes it into ACT!.

It seemed to stop working around about the time of switchover to British Summer Time (clocks moved forward 1 hr in the UK).

To remedy (after much messing about!), I first stopped the ACT Connect service (from right-click of the sync app in system tray), and then exited the sync/connect app from the same right click menu, and  went into c:\documents and settings\all users \application data\act\mobility, and moved all the files there into a directory called old (basically I deleted them, but backed up just in case).

Upon restarting the ACT! Connect program, a new sync began, and everything has made it into the portal. We’re about to test portal -> program sync, but I’m sure it’ll be OK.

On Vista/7/8, the directory would probably be C:\ProgramData\Act\mobility – basically it’s the “All Users” profile appdata.

I should add that I did a “recover” from the sync applications right-click menu first. This clears out everything in the portal. It might not have been necessary, or maybe you’ll get duplicate data if you don’t do it?